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Recent Developments 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin 
I n Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin, 350 Md. 552, 714 
A.2d 188 (1998), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held the 
accountant-client privilege not to 
be absolute, but may generally be 
waived by the client for third 
parties to gain access to certain 
types of confidential information. 
In so holding, the court clarified 
the nature of the privilege noting 
that a client could waive the 
privilege through conduct of his 
. own or through certain disclosures 
to third parties. While not 
expanding the accountant-client 
privilege, the court nevertheless 
reinforced the protection given 
individuals against unintended 
waiver of the privilege. 
In August 1995, the Circuit 
Court for Prince George's County 
found that Paul Gussin ("Gus sin") 
owed creditor Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. ("Sears"), a judgment in the 
amount of $36,031.46. In order to 
enforce this judgment, Sears 
sought discovery of Gussin's 
financial records. Complying with 
this request, Gussin produced his 
1994 federal income tax return. 
On his income tax return, filed 
jointly with his wife Jocelyn, 
Gussin reported $247,787.00 in 
investment income, and 
$161,000.00 in "other gains and 
losses." Gussin testified that his 
accountant, Ernst & Young, L.L.P. 
of Baltimore ("E & Y"), prepared 
his tax return and that any 
documents revealing ownership of 
his various investments would be 
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 70 
CREDITOR DOES 
NOT HA VE RIGHT 
TO FINANCIAL 
RECORDS AND 





PROVIDE A VALID 
WAIVER TO THE 
ACCOUNTANT-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
By Steven E. Shane 
likely to be kept with them. Aside 
from the income reported on his 
federal income tax return, Gussin 
alleged that he did not own any 
assets of significance, including 
bank accounts or his residence. 
His wife then testified that her 
husband had received 
approximately six million dollars 
in the mid-1980's for his sale of a 
one-third interest in their shoe 
store business. When questioned 
by Sears' counsel about his 
ownership interest in these assets, 
Gussin replied that he believed 
Sears could better direct the 
questions regarding the location of 
his financial records to his 
accountant, E & Y. Specifically, 
Sears' counsel asked Gussin, 
"Would Ernst & Young have the 
papers also?" Gussin replied, "I 
imagine. I don't know. They did 
the tax return. You could ask 
them." Thereafter, Sears served E 
& Y with a subpoena at their 
Baltimore office in order to obtain 
discovery of Gussin's assets and 
financial position. 
The subpoena ordered the 
accounting firm to designate a 
representative to testify as to 
particular documents which related 
to Gussin's ownership interests in 
the investments reported on his 
1994 federal income tax return. E 
& Y objected to the subpoena 
asserting that the firm would 
comply with the request only by 
written court order. At a July 1997 
hearing in the Circuit Court for 
Prince George's County, Sears 
responded to E & Y's objections 
by arguing: (1) Gussin waived the 
accountant-client privilege through 
his responses at the deposition and 
(2) Gussin made a fraudulent 
conveyance of his records which 
precluded him from relying on the 
accountant-client privilege. Sears 
did not contend that Gussin's 
records were themselves not 
privileged information. 
The circuit court ruled that the 
accountant-client privilege asserted 
by Gussin had not been waived. In 
response, Sears appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted certiorari on 
its own motion prior to its review 
by the intermediate appellate court. 
The court of appeals reasoned 
that, like other privileges, the 
purpose of the accountant-client 
privilege is to open the channels of 
communication between the 
accountant and client. Sears, 350 
Md. at 562, 714 A.2d at 193. The 
privilege better enables the 
accountant to perform his job and, 
at the same time, protects the 
client's expectation of privacy in 
. various types of civil matters and 
controversies. Id. (citing In re 
Special Investigation No. 202, 53 
Md. App. 96, 100,452 A.2d 458, 
460 (1982). 
Moreover, according to the 
language of section 9-110, the 
privilege against disclosure by a 
licensed certified public 
accountant of the contents of any 
communication made by a client in 
the course of rendering 
professional services, is "clear and 
unambiguous." Id. at 563, 714 
A.2d at 193 (citing MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 9-110 
(Supp.1997)). Without express or 
implied authorization from the 
client or a valid waiver (i.e. waiver 
by the client's disclosure to third 
parties), client information remains 
protected from disclosure. !d. at 
565, 714 A.2d at 194. 
Accordingly, Gussin's statement 
taken in the context of the 
deposition was not intended to 
divulge confidential documents or 
any other information not required 
to be disclosed by law. Id. The 
court reasoned that Gussin's 
statement, "you can ask them," 
while permitting Sears to inquire 
as to the location of specific 
documents, did not give E & Y 
discretion to disclose the contents 
of those documents. Id. at 564, 
714 A.2d at 193. The court opined 
that, generally, a party will not 
waive the privilege simply "by 
denying the opposing party's 
accusations." Id. at 567, 714 A.2d 
at 195. The court further stated 
that "[m]erely 'being difficult'" is 
not enough to justify waiver of the 
privilege. Id. Moreover, nothing 
in Gussin' s conduct suggested to 
the court that he wished the 
documents to be anything but 
confidential. Id. The court 
believed Gussin's statement was 
"not in the nature of a disclosure 
such that fairness would require 
that the privilege cease." Id. 
Finally, the court ruled that Sears 
did not meet its burden of 
establishing waVler of the 
privilege. 
In response to Sears' second 
claim of the fraudulent 
conveyance, the court noted that 
the facts did not support the 
application of the exception. Id. at 
569, 714 A.2d at 196. Therefore, 
the court could not consider 
whether a fraud exception would 
be applicable to the accountant-
client privilege. Id. In so doing, 
the court held that evidence of 
Gussin's previous assets were 
insufficient to establish a basis for 
fraud. Id. The fact that Gussin in 
the past had millions of dollars in 
assets alone, did not constitute the 
requisite prima facie showing of 
fraud. Id. 
The court also did not consider 
whether the actual documents in E 
& Y's possession could be 
protected. Id. at 570, 714 A.2d at 
196. Neither Gussin nor Sears 
ever raised the issue, rather both 
sides focused on whether the 
protection itself was actually 
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waived. Id. The court did note, in 
important dicta, that "a client may 
not immunize otherwise 
discoverable material from the 
reach of another party by 
transferring possession of those 
materials to an accountant." Id. 
While accountants may hail the 
court's decision as buttressing the 
accountant-client privilege, a 
closer examination of the decision 
reveals this not to be entirely 
accurate. In fact, as a point of 
emphasis and clarification, the 
court opted to specifically address 
the argument put forth by E & Y --
that the privilege could be waived 
solely by express permission. The 
court concluded that this 
interpretation was not only 
erroneous, but neither supported 
by law nor policy. As such, the 
court refused to elevate the 
privilege to a higher status than 
most other privileges in the state 
(i.e. attorney-client, doctor-patient) 
which may be waived by the 
client's conduct. It is the court's 
view that the General Assembly 
did not intend such a result by 
enacting section 9-110. The court 
supported its assertion by noting 
that section 9-11 O(b) provides that 
the privilege itself does not affect 
such domains as the bankruptcy 
laws and criminal laws or a 
regulatory proceeding by the 
Public Accountancy Board. While 
the court did not rule on the 
question of protection of the actual 
documents, court dicta implied that 
these papers would not be 
immunized from discovery. 
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